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INTRODUCTION 
 
In a review of the global antitrust legislation, agreements between com-
petitors have always been considered as illegal acts of a major importance be-
cause of their strong anticompetitive effect that can deliver.  That is why such 
“behaviors” are strictly regulated and severely put under restrictions and prohibi-
tions. As far as European judicial system is concerned the main tasks of regu-
lating and producing law are held by the European Commission which, along 
with the national antitrust authorities, has the particular role to draft new regula-
tions in order to be up to date and deal with the uprising difficulties and new 
case laws. 
Not all the types of agreements have equal anticompetitive impact on 
consumers market. Horizontal agreements, for example, represent for the com-
petitors1 a major threat in comparison to the so called vertical agreements due 
to the different type of interests that those agreements tend to affect. In fact, the 
first ones take place between competitive companies in order to gain a major 
advantage and maximize their profits, while the consumers become the weak 
part of the equation. On the other hand, vertical agreements concern compa-
nies that belong to different productive stages of the very same mother compa-
ny. In that case their interests are in a heavy contrast and their cooperation 
aims to a more functional and efficient presence in the market.  
Businesses are always trying to keep up with competition and deliver 
their goods and services in the very best way to consumers. Some companies 
operate in a fully operational way and undertake the various processes of pro-
duction, development and distribution on their own. Others, in some of these 
areas, may cooperate with other companies. Horizontal agreements between 
companies that operate at the same level of production may appeal commer-
cially attractive. Enables companies to minimize risks and lower their costs and 
that can be appear as a total advantage for consumers’ interests. New technol-
                                                 
1 As well as for consumers.  To examine in more detail in the next paragraphs. 
ogies and products of a better quality can be distributed offering consumers a 
variety of more sophisticated and advanced products on a cheaper price. 
European Institutions have always dealt with great attention matters re-
garding competition. The legislator’s mere intent is to maximize market’s effi-
ciency and increase social welfare and common interest. This publication exam-
ines the way European Union apply competition rules and more specifically how 
article  101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is generally 
applied to horizontal agreements between different companies and what is the 
analysis of the constitutional elements of that specific article. Furthermore, 
through the second part we are going to view some arguments about criminali-
zation of the antitrust enforcement and whether is desirable or not. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1.1: European antitrust: historical background and sphere of application. 
 
During the last half of nineteenth century, European industry, likewise the 
American one, was marked by a rapid spread of cartels between competitive 
companies. This kind of proliferation has mostly signed countries like France, 
Greta Britain, Luxemburg, Austrian-Hungarian Empire and in a great measure 
Germany also. It was the latter that first of all and in order to curb its high rates 
of inflation and maintain economic stability during this period, has adopted in 
1923 the very first antitrust regulation to put cartels under control. The 1923 
German legislation created for the first time in Europe a new and wide debate 
about cartels. According to the debaters of the opposing theory, cooperation 
among companies was facilitating economic growth and was the perfect tool of 
achieving public interest purposes. Indeed, in the international sphere cartels 
were not regulated as they were strongly used as instrument of economical poli-
tics in order to rebuild European economy due to the global economic collapse 
after the First World War and Great Depression. On the other hand, there were 
those voices throughout Europe that kept emphasizing the fact that this kind of 
concentration of raw material and power in a unique territory was the main rea-
son that facilitate totalitarian regimes to take over control and start a devastating 
war along with all the consequences that the globe had to deal with. 
It was due to the latter point of view that some of the European Nations decided 
to regulate and prevent creation of cartels especially in sectors such as heavy 
industrial sector was. The first European antitrust regulation was born. Treaty of 
Paris2  was signed on 18 April 1951 between France, West Germany, Italy and 
the three Benelux countries3  establishing the European Coal and Steel com-
munity (ECSC). It was by those same countries that another important and his-
torical treaty was established, the Treaty of Rome4. In fact it was this Treaty that 
gave birth to the idea of a united Europe and a European common market. With 
the insertion of the first antitrust rules the anti competition discipline gained a 
                                                 
2 Formally the “Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community”. 
3 Belgium, Luxemburg and Netherlands. 
4 The CEE Treaty. See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3Axy0023 
more expanded territory of application. Besides, the main goal of the founders 
of the European Union was not only the creation of a uniform antitrust law, but 
moreover was the integration of all the Nations of Europe. Furthermore, there 
was the necessity to provide all these warranties for all the four principal free-
doms such as free movement of persons, products, services and capitals. That 
is why European Union and all the National antitrust authorities have always 
sanctioned in a very severe way actions and behaviors aiming to harm uniformi-
ty and equality and bring discrimination amongst the various European nations. 
 
1.2: Agreements between undertakings. Article 101 TFEU. 
 
The relevance of regulating agreements that can distort competition is 
highly evidenced and sanctioned in all judicial systems. There are strong differ-
ences, both substantial and procedural, among the various international anti-
trust legal disciplines. Nevertheless, they all have as a common element the se-
verity and strictness with which distorting agreements are dealt with. Hugh 
sanctions are applied whereas an illegal and unlawful agreement is discovered. 
Agreements between competitors are viewed by the legislator with the maxi-
mum of attention because of the strong anti competitive effect that can deliver in 
the market. However, the European Regulation does not make any distinction 
between the various types of agreements. Article regulates all agreements in-
discriminately without making distinction of either they are horizontal or vertical. 
Furthermore, the European legislator did not provide with any exhaustive case 
lists or an extended and clear terminology. Maybe that was an intended volition 
of the European legislators in order to give more space of interpretation and ap-
plication to the national anti competitive authorities. More specifically Article 101 
TFEU provides:   
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: 
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertak-
ings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States 
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion 
of competition within the internal market, and in particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading condi-
tions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading par-
ties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties 
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial 
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be au-
tomatically void. 
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the 
case of: 
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, 
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, 
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to pro-
moting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of 
the resulting benefit, and which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispen-
sable to the attainment of these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect 
of a substantial part of the products in question. 
 
1.2.1: First constitutive element. Meaning of Undertaking. 
 
The first element of our matter in question is the subjective scope of ap-
plication of the antitrust discipline. The prohibition of article 101 TFEU concerns 
actions taken by two or more companies and therefore we are talking about a 
concurrence of wills and not about the actions taken only by one undertaking. 
First of all we should comprehend what would be the exact notion of undertak-
ing. In fact, it is hard to find a proper definition provided by the European legal 
order. However, that lack of definition was probably intentional. Because of the 
presence of such a variety and different point of views of the various national 
legislators as to what undertaking means, the European legislator opted to 
leave that part blank. Since there is not a common vision of what undertaking 
means, the European legislator did not want to favor one concept more than 
another. However, in order to guarantee an equal way of application of the leg-
islation, the European Court of Justice has interpreted the notion by taking a 
broad definition which provides that: “the concept of an undertaking encom-
passes every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal sta-
tus of the entity and the way in which it is financed…”5. It is clear that this defini-
tion is quite vague and includes a great number of subjects, given that by eco-
nomic activity we mean all those activities that offer products and/or services to 
a certain market. It is exempted from that rule all those bodies that exercise 
public authority or where their actions are driven by the principle of the common 
good and public solidarity. 
After having clarified what undertaking means6 it is very important to real-
ize how the regulation applies in that cases where although two companies 
have separate legal personalities, they however belong to the same group of 
business and are strictly bonded by strong economical relationships. It is very 
important to stabilize whether these type of companies should be considered as 
distinct and separate in order to extinct any doubt or misunderstanding and clar-
ify if we are in front of a case of passive competition or not.7 So there is the ne-
cessity to establish if the illicit agreements were held by two distinct companies 
and sanction both of them or to be considered as a unique undertaking and not 
proceed into taking any measures. It was the European Court of Justice that 
                                                 
5 Case C-41/90 Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macratron GmbH [1991] ECR I-1979. 
6 At least as widely identified by the European courts. 
7 Think about companies that claim that are in competition in order to deviate controls or distort 
and mislead their main and direct competitors. 
gave the solution to that for one more time.8 That means that since there is an 
economic unity then there must also be an effective and real exercise of control 
by the leader company. There is a concrete relationship of control when one 
company dictate and impose in a decisive way its will on the other companies of 
that economic unity.9  
1.2.2: The other constitutive elements.  
The concept of agreements between undertakings is concretized in the 
very first paragraph of article 101 TFEU where there have been indicated three 
different types of collusion and these are horizontal agreements, decisions tak-
en by association of companies and concerted practices.  
Horizontal agreements are those that bear the most elevated interest as 
well as legal tension and importance. The agreement is manifested when two or 
more undertakings agree upon a common plan to follow or declare their mutual 
will to take certain actions within the common market or even by simply deciding 
not to act at all. It is the demonstration of a common will that mostly character-
izes horizontal agreements. It does not matter whether that concurrence of wills 
will be expressed either in a direct way or implicitly nor if that joint volition will 
have a specific form or not10. This type of agreement can produce three main 
types of commitment between the involving parts; it can produce legal obliga-
tions in that case where the specific agreement is a proper written contract be-
tween the parts; it can be manifested as an economic obligation whereas the 
connection between the parts concerns the exchange of share holdings and 
joint ventures or it can simply consist of moral bond the so-called gentlemen’s 
agreements that can be concluded by a straight hand shake and is the hardest 
to be proven. In any case scenario the agreement is developed and completed 
                                                 
8 According to the General Court: ´Article 101(1) of the Treaty is aimed at economic units which 
consists of a unitary organisation of personal, tangible and intangible elements, which pursues a 
specific economic aim on a long-term basis and can contribute to the commission of an in-
fringement of the kind referred to in that provision. See Case T-9/99 HFB Holding für Fernwär-
metechnik Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and Others v Commission of the European 
Communities [2002] ECR II-01487.  
9 See definition of concentration art. 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 
2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation). 
10 See case C-74/04 P, Volkswagen 
 
in three steps: the moment of conclusion, the next step which concerns the ex-
ecution of the aforementioned agreement and finally we have the production of 
the effects on the relevant market. For the antitrust legislator is already enough 
the very first step in order for an infringement to be established and prosecuted. 
In fact, only by the mutual manifestation of the concurring wills the agreement is 
perfected and has potentially the power to distort, prevent or restrict competition 
within the internal market. It does not even matter if the agreement will eventu-
ally produce its effects in the market and is still prohibited under article 101 
TFEU. The other two steps of realization of the agreement will determine the 
level of the gravity of such an infraction of the anti competitive regulations and 
consequently will influence the calculation of the amount of the sanction that the 
anti competitive authorities will apply.  
The second type of collusion is that case where we are in front of deci-
sions of an association of enterprises. As in the first case of horizontal agree-
ments the legislator wanted to categorize and distinguish those cases where the 
similarities with an agreement are quite similar.  In that case the expression of 
the volition concerns a collective will of a plurality of enterprises that are united 
under an associative form of structure and there are strong and absolute influ-
ential guidelines that oblige the companies that take part to follow. The deci-
sions are binding not only among the member companies that have participated 
and approved of the decision in question but also between those members that 
did not agree or even more did not take part in the whole process of deciding.  
In fact, the legislators’ will was the attribution of the power to the competent au-
thorities to accuse and sanction not only the association of enterprises as a 
whole, but also every single undertaking that takes part.  
Special attention has also been given by the legislator to the so called concert-
ed practices that can be either horizontal or vertical as well. There is a major 
difficult to prove whether a concerted practice has been put in action or not. In-
deed, it is not by an expression of volition or a decision of associations that can 
be proven it has to be deducted by conclusive facts. There can be a form of co-
ordination between competitive undertakings which, without having reached a 
some kind of explicit agreement, they however cooperate and assist each other 
in disadvantage of the rest of the competitors and moreover in distorting compe-
tition11. In order to prove that a concerted practice has been put in action there 
are three constitutive elements that should be put in evidence. In first place 
there has to be proven that there has been a contact between the undertakings 
or an exchange of crucial information. The disclosure by one competitor to an-
other of its future intentions or conduct on the relevant market designated to al-
ter and distort competition12. Consequently there has to be an adaptation of the 
conduct by the parties on the basis of the information received. Conclusively 
there has to be an externalization and a certain manifestation in the market 
through a parallel behavior. In other words there has to be a straight connection 
between cause and effect. In that matter special attention has to be paid and 
more specifically to the fact that not all the parallel behaviors are meant to be 
concerted practices. For example an increasing of the prices of a raw material 
could easily bring a price fixing by all the companies that are involved in that 
specific sector and in the specific market. However, an autonomous decision of 
that kind cannot be sanctioned. In fact parallel behavior is a way to distinguish 
that case scenario from another. In an attempt to put some more light in that el-
ements and give a more solid example of a case of a concerted practice a 
deeper analysis should be done regarding the famous decision of the European 
Court of Justice and the Dutch mobile operators.13  In June 4th, 2009 the Euro-
pean Court of Justice released a verdict on a reference from the Dutch courts 
about a single meeting between five Dutch undertakings from the sector of mo-
bile phone in which the companies had discussed the reduction of commission 
payments made to dealers for the sale of mobile phone contracts. For the Euro-
pean Court of Justice that was a clear breach of the anti-competition regulation. 
According to the Court, a concerted practice pursues an anti-competitive object 
where, according to its content and objectives and having regard to its legal and 
economic context, it is capable in an individual case of resulting in the restriction 
of competition. It is not necessary to be actual distortion of competition or a di-
rect connection between the concerted practice and the fixation of the prices. 
                                                 
11 See cases n. 40/73, SuikerUnie and C-89/85, Ahlström 
 
12  See case T-25/95,Cement  
 
13 See case 8/08 T-mobile Netherlands BV and others, June 4th , 2009 
An exchange of information between two or more competitors can be character-
ized as a collusion and is described with an anti-competitive object if that specif-
ic exchange of crucial information is able to remove any uncertainties or doubts 
regarding the intended conduct of the participating enterprises. Furthermore, 
during the examination of whether there is a causal connection between the 
concerted practice and the market conduct of the companies participating in the 
practice the national court held that, subject to proof to the contrary, it is for the 
undertakings concerned to adduce, to apply the presumption of a causal con-
nection established in the Court’s case-law, according to which, where they re-
main active on that market, such undertakings are presumed to take account of 
the information exchanged with their competitors. As far as the undertaking par-
ticipating in the concerted practice remains active on the market in question, 
there is a presumption of a causal connection between the prohibited action and 
the conduct of the undertaking on that market, even if the concerted action is 
the result of a meeting held by the participating undertakings on a single occa-
sion. 
There are a lot of similarities between concerted practice (horizontal) and 
horizontal agreement. There is a high probability that authorities classify an anti-
trust illegal action as a concerted practice even if we are in front of a case of an 
horizontal agreement instead. It is much easier to prove a case like the latter 
than support a debate, a proposition or thesis of the existence of an agreement. 
However, the European legislator has already ruled over those issues. Accord-
ing to the European Court of Justice there is no need to distinct clearly “agree-
ment” and “concerted practice” over a certain period of time.14  
 
1.2.3 : Restriction of competition by object or by effect. 
                                                 
14  See joined cases T-305/94, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV and Others νs Commission of 
the European Communities.  
 
 
 
Another important constitutive element of the anti competition regulation, as 
seen in article 101 TFEU, is that all agreements between undertakings are pro-
hibited if they have as object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition. Thus, if we have to proceed to an evaluation of an agreement it is 
necessary to examine whether there is the presence of one of those criteria in 
order to decide to apply a sanction or not. The agreements that have as an ob-
ject the distortion of competition are agreements intrinsically anti competitive. It 
would be totally unnecessary to prove that the specific agreement would have 
an anti-competitive effect in order to find an infringement of Article 101, para-
graph 1 TFEU. Horizontal agreements that have in their epicenter intention such 
as price fixing, market or customers sharing or/and limiting output or sales are 
there to distort and restrict competition. Dealing with this type of agreement is 
where we find a fundamental difference between the European legal system 
and the American one. As a matter of fact, in the United States the judicial sys-
tem deal these matters according to the so called per se rule and as a conse-
quence they a priori dismiss them without having them examined and in any 
case. In Europe, on the other hand, it is applied the so called rule of reason. 
There is the presumption of illegality and the sanction does not apply in an au-
tomatic way. In fact, the competent authorities are not obliged to prove if the 
agreement in question is illegal or not, but it is on the undertakings that have 
concluded the agreement that bear the burden to prove whether such behavior 
falls into those cases of exemption that the same legislator has put in the anti 
competitive regulation and we are going to see on the next paragraphs.  
For those agreements, on the other hand, that represent the majority of the 
cases that do not have as an object the distortion of competition, we have to 
evaluate the effects of such an agreement on the market in order to stabilize 
whether to apply or not any sanctions. It is necessary to conduct an exhaustive 
analysis of its impact on the internal market and clarify the gravity of the infrac-
tion and its substance and consequently find out there is an eventual exemption 
rule to apply. The Commission Guidelines have been clear on that matter.15  
More specifically , the Commission has ruled that: “For an agreement to be re-
strictive by effect it must affect actual or potential competition to such an extent 
                                                 
15 See Art. 81 (3) EC, OJ 27.4.2004, C101/97 , Commission Guidelines 
 
that on the relevant market negative effects on prices, output, innovation or va-
riety or quality of goods and services can be expected with a reasonable degree 
of probability”16. Furthermore, the Commission analyzes all these elements and 
facts that have to be examined in order to assess whether we are in front of an 
illicit agreement or not. It states: “For the purpose of analyzing the restrictive ef-
fects of an agreement it is normally necessary to define the relevant market. It is 
normally also necessary to examine and assess, inter alia ,the nature of the 
products, the market position of the parties, the market position of competitors, 
the market position of buyers, the existence of potential competitors and the 
level of entry barriers”.17 
 
1.2.4 Council Regulation n. 1/2003. De Minimis Rule. Block Exemptions. 
 
Another important element to assess is the level of consistency of the re-
strictive element. If the agreement cannot be considered harmful of competition 
then it cannot be prohibited. For the valuation of the effects that an agreement 
can bring in the market we have to examine the presence of the undertakings in 
question in such market. The theoretical question to make is what would be the 
results in case that this agreement has not produced any effects in the very first 
place. That kind of examination allows us to assess whether the equilibrium in 
the market has been affected or not and to what extend that agreement has to 
be prohibited or not.  
The first element to examine is the so called safe harbor rule. The legislator 
wanted to put a de minimis limit of a certain percentage under which an agree-
ment can automatically be considered exempted. It is a negative or better say 
passive way to establish whether an infringement has been made or not. The 
legislator has set that the market share of the undertakings participating in hori-
zontal agreements must not exceed the limit of a percentage equal to 10%. 
However that rules is not applicable with any distinction to all the cases but 
there are some hard core restrictions as well. Whenever an agreement has as 
                                                 
16 See paragraph 24. 
17 See paragraph 27 
on object terms that tend to harm competition then these agreements cannot 
make use of the safe harbor rule. The legislator has been very clear as to what 
extend and how to consider the exemptions as described in the third paragraph 
of article 101 TFEU. More specifically the provisions of paragraph 3 state that is 
declared inapplicable the prohibitions of the first paragraph whenever and in the 
case of:  
–any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings,  
–any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings,  
–any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,  
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to pro-
moting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of 
the resulting benefit, and which does not:  
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispen-
sable to the attainment of these objectives;  
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect 
of a substantial part of the products in question. The first element to assess is 
the legislator’s intention to enhance competition and incentivize an improvement 
in production of the goods when there is a proof that a n agreement between 
competitors has brought a major cost efficiencies or cost reduction as well as 
the improvement of the quality of goods. There have also been some considera-
tions regarding public policy issues such as environmental protection, employ-
ment, culture, health, consumer protection and industrial policy relied to only to 
supplement economic benefits generated by the agreement. In a second place 
we have to assess the adequacy of the participation of the parties. There must 
be a comparison between the cost that users have to pay and the benefits that 
they receive. If the cost to bear is high then in a close relation, benefits should 
be of a higher quality as well in order to achieve the so called fair share. A third 
prerequisite to observe in order for the undertakings to obtain the exemption is 
that the agreement must contain restrictions which are indispensable to the 
achievement of the benefits. It is necessary to evaluate that third element under 
the so called two-tier test. First of all, the restrictive agreement as such must be 
reasonably necessary in order to achieve efficiencies. Furthermore, individual 
restrictions of competition that derive form the agreement must also be reason-
ably necessary for the attainment of the efficiencies. In a different case such re-
strictions would not be indispensable. For example, if the efficiencies specific to 
the agreement can be achieved by other practicable and less restrictive means, 
then it will not be necessary in the first place to enter in such an agreement. In 
conclusion the legislator has put a very important prerequisite for the parties to 
observe. It is indispensable the fact that the agreement as a whole should not 
lead to the elimination of competition itself. Benefits of a short-term must not be 
outweighed by long-term losses that can lead to the elimination of competition. 
One should examine the competitive restraints imposed on the parties and also 
assess the level of competition that existed prior to the agreement by consider-
ing the market shares of the parties. 
 
1.2.5 Compensation of damages. Antitrust Enforcement 
 
     In any case an extensive analysis of acts, elements and prerequisites 
has to be done in order to examine thoroughly every single case matter. Not 
one case scenario is similar to another due to the plurality and types of com-
mercial activities and the vast, global legal and economic environment. The 
question to be made is to what extend can and should the undertakings be free 
to expand their activities and co operations in order to maximize their profits. Is 
there enough control upon those actions and does the European legal frame-
work suffice to regulate and module actions that violate the competition regula-
tions? Article 101 TFEU, paragraph 2 provides that any agreements or deci-
sions pursuant to this article shall be void. Antitrust enforcement in the Europe-
an legal system is mainly divided in public and private enforcement.  It is im-
portant to maintain the balance between them and should be seen as an inte-
grated system in order to achieve a major grade of deterrence and compensa-
tion as well. Obtaining these two great tools is the key to provide that private 
enforcement does not affect the effectiveness of public enforcement. On the 
other hand, private enforcement should be more efficient in order to enhance 
the anti-competition regime and that consumers would be more protected and 
ensured that if they suffer injury from an anti-competitive conduct, should be en-
titled to full compensation. However, legal professors throughout Europe ques-
tion themselves wherever a criminal enforcement should be more appropriate, 
more efficient in terms of protecting consumers and the general benefit of a so-
ciety. Should we enhance and promote a path towards more severe and strict 
penal sanctions or that would be devastating for a liberal capitalistic economy 
and against fundamental rights of the individual? 
 
2.1. Cartels and Penal Law 
 
Another question that comes up is whether cartels could be compared to 
a common criminal offender. There is a big part of authors that have that proper 
idea. Acts and conducts that aim to distort competition rules such as price fixing 
could be no different than a common penal crime such is theft is. It is not only 
the moral aspect of such infringements that matters which however is extremely 
and equally important to the malum prohibitum itself. When an illicit conduct, 
such as horizontal agreement between competitors is, is brought in action that 
signifies that consumers will suffer significant losses in economical terms and 
not only. In reality that could not be different than a proper and common rob-
bery. There exist all elements of an illegal action which would be criminally 
sanctioned. As a matter of fact there are a number of judicial legal systems 
through Europe that treat cartel activities as crimes. Greece is amongst one of 
them18, as well as Ireland is with the enactment of its Competition Act 200219 
which both are identical to the provisions of articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Greek 
legislator has provided that when an agreement or a concerted practice is held 
between competitors then a detention of at least two years can be applied along 
with administrative fines.  Nevertheless, Greek legislator is proven more soft 
and provided also that if the parties repent and help the competent authorities 
with their processional work then the involved parts will be exempted from penal 
execution. On the other hand, Spanish legislator has been proven stricter and 
provided that if a criminal offence carries the maximum sentence of at least 5 
years for conviction on indictment, that offence is deemed as a detention of-
fence. This means that a suspect can be arrested either with or without warrant 
and detained. Then there is  a report of OECD that states that : there is an off-
                                                 
18 See art. 44, law number 3959/2011 of April 20th, part of penal sanctions. 
19 See sections 4 and 5 Competition Act 2002 
setting consideration relating to individual sanctions, however. In many coun-
tries, sanctioning individuals requires criminalization of conduct. In that context, 
individuals have the rights against criminalization, which makes it more difficult 
to obtain evidence from them unless they willingly co-operate. In this sense, 
criminalization of cartel conduct for individuals makes voluntary co operation 
more possible, because of the threat of personal sanctions, but also makes it 
more necessary, because a right against self-incrimination arises.20 Further-
more, we can add that there is also a strong moral message that passes out 
through a sentence or even the threat that imprisonments carries with. It is that 
psychological factor that falls over the shoulders of the corporate managers and 
plays a role of dissuasion. 
 
2.2.: For which type of antitrust violations is imprisonment desirable? 
 
There was huge debate about the cost effectiveness of imprisonment 
and specifically in those cases where an unjust imprisonment will be made. 
Both moral and numerical cost is way too high for societies to support and ac-
cept.  These costs include not only the suffering of all those that had been de-
tained unjustly but also the risk of lawful behavior from those individuals that 
who risk imprisonment, as well as a variety of negative effects on both the de-
tained individuals and society. There is not an easy way to determine whether a 
certain anticompetitive conduct is more legible for such a cruel punishment than 
another. Some say that this distinction is easier simply by choosing the simpli-
fied option to categorize horizontal agreements that aim to price fixing and bid 
rigging as more crystal clear cases. But again, are we ready to bear that huge 
responsibility, such as taking someone’s liberty is, as civilized society?  
It would much easier if we just opt to apply other sanctions alternatives to 
imprisonment. First of all we could establish huge fines for both the enterprises 
and their managers or whoever gets involved in an illicit antitrust action. Fur-
thermore, there could be more strict administrative sanctions, such as disquali-
fications of the directors are. The risk of both losing money and their jobs is also 
great and should suffice and a priori work as dissuasive means in order for the 
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individuals to not get involved in an illicit action. Think about a person who gets 
sanctioned in such a hard way that could not easily find another job as of his 
spoiled curriculum vitae. These measurements could be sufficient as a discour-
agement method.  
Along with all these rhetorical questions, however, another big juridical 
matter is rising. It is the contrast between administrative sanctions and penal 
sanctions. The principle of Ne Bis in Idem is a fundamental right in the Europe-
an legislation and judicial system. By applying both sanctions we could fall in a 
trap where we could contradict our own law and override important freedoms 
and rights. 
 
2.3: The principle of Ne Bis in Idem. Material and Jurisdictional Scope  
 
Ne bis in idem provisions, even those established in international instru-
ments, has traditionally been limited in their scope to internal application within 
national jurisdictions. The irregular appearance of ne bis in idem from a com-
parative perspective is often given as the main reason for a jurisdictional limita-
tion of the principle in an international context. This variability is certainly prob-
lematic to the intra-judicial application of the principle. Perhaps more fundamen-
tal however is the unwillingness of states to compromise sovereignty in the field 
of criminal law, which is seen as essential to the authority and the effectiveness 
of the state. It is as a consequence of this rare for national jurisdictions to rec-
ognize foreign judgments as having the effects of res judicata. This is an aspect 
of the international order and justifications derived from the ne bis in idem prin-
ciple on a national level are not common. It is common, within national jurisdic-
tions, to separate between the procedures and penalties of criminal law and 
penalties and procedures of an administrative nature. That is, penalties or pro-
cedures are organized by reference to the type of law that they are a part of. Ne 
bis in idem is generally construed as unable to translate between these different 
legal spheres. That is, causes from one of the spheres do not usually trigger ne 
bis in idem effects in the other. The principle can also be understood as appli-
cable with different weight in different legal spheres. The acceptability of such 
limitations in light of the EU rules on ne bis in idem is not well accepted. 
  
2.4  Context of Ne Bis in Idem in EU Law  
  
Ne bis in idem has traditionally been construed as a principle of criminal 
law applicable within national jurisdictions.  In the context of EU law this poses 
something of a problem. The EU forms a new legal order for which direct com-
parisons with state jurisdictions are of limited relevance. This can be seen, spe-
cifically, in the difficulty to transpose the category of criminal law as such as well 
as many of its constituent elements to the supranational level. So, in EU law, by 
necessity if ne bis in idem is to have any traction its material and jurisdictional 
limits must be reformulated. What does determine those borders will be dis-
cussed below, but this section will forego that discussion somewhat by introduc-
ing cursorily those areas of law in which the principle has appeared most prom-
inently. To be sure, the somewhat anachronistical placement of this section is 
problematic.  
 
  
2.5  Criminal Law in the EU 
  
After a long and arduous journey, EU criminal law competences are now 
relatively neatly regulated in title V of the TFEU, more specifically, the proce-
dural and substantive competences are given in articles 82 and 83 respectively. 
Secondly, the concept of criminal law within the context of the EU incorporates 
a tension between European integration on one hand and state sovereignty on 
the other, which for a long time this issue was laying dormant within the frame-
work of European integration in the EU context. However, with the development 
of the Union into an area of freedom, security and justice and its merge with the 
internal market after the conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty, brings this conflict into 
relief. Thirdly, perhaps the prime example of the emergence of this tension is 
the establishment of mutual recognition as the “cornerstone” of cooperation 
within the area of freedom, security and justice. Inspired by internal market prin-
ciples, it means essentially that judicial decisions, including judgments, of one 
Member State shall be recognized and executed by another. Several instru-
ments on judicial cooperation incorporating the principle of mutual recognition 
have been issued, beginning with the Framework Decision on the European Ar-
rest Warrant, which is still perhaps the most famous example. 
 It has been supplemented by various other instruments and together they con-
stitute a framework for judicial cooperation based on the mutual recognition 
principle. Most of these instruments contain ne bis in idem provisions as volun-
tary refusal grounds. In the context of the European Arrest Warrant, however, 
the relevant ne bis in idem provision obliges Member States to refuse coopera-
tion. 
       Lastly, while it has for a long time been assumed that the EU lacked com-
petences in criminal law as such, the Union has instead relied on its compe-
tence to define offences and sanctions of a ”non-criminal” nature to enforce its 
interests. This is the case for example in the law of the environment and of pub-
lic procurement, but the most notable example of this is found in the field of EU 
competition law. In other areas of Union law, such as agricultural law, while their 
ultimate enforcement is left to the Member States, the Union nevertheless pro-
vides both the source and the substance of administrative penalties. 
  
2.6 EU Competition law  
 
Competition law became part of the legal order of what is now the EU by 
virtue of articles 85-90 of the original Treaty establishing the European Econom-
ic Community in 1958. Considering the fact that of the six founding Member 
States, two at that time had no national competition law at all and two had sys-
tems based on abuse control rather than straight-out prohibition of cartels and 
abuse of dominant position, the inclusion of the named provisions should be 
considered extraordinarily progressive. In order to give effect to the treaty rules 
on competition, an implementing regulation was adopted in 1962.21 For a num-
ber of reasons, the structure opted for was one of centralization, with the Com-
mission monopolizing the competence to apply the treaty provisions on compe-
tition. Through a broad interpretation of the applicability of those provisions by 
the ECJ, the scope of community competition law developed to become very 
extensive. When combined, these two facts meant that the commission in time 
                                                 
21 Council Regulation (EEC) No 17/62, OJ 13, 21.2.1962, p. 204–211 
became quite overburdened by its competence and in time it became clear that 
the situation was unsustainable. Before turning to the reform of the earlier sys-
tem, however, two aspects of that system should be noted. First, the rudimen-
tary character of the framework on procedure in competition proceedings laid 
down in the abovementioned regulation along with the generally proactive 
stance of the Court of Justice at the time combined to form a particularly suita-
ble environment for the development of community law in general and the prin-
ciple of ne bis in idem in particular. Secondly, and notably, the wide compe-
tence of the commission to sanction cartels did not mean that national competi-
tion law and NCAs were completely marginalized. In a seminal judgment, to 
which we will have reason to return when considering the sources of the ne bis 
in idem principle, the procedural division of competences between the national  
authorities and the EU was first set out. In 2003, however, persistent calls for 
the reformation of the centralized system of enforcement of EU competition law 
finally led to a new regulation which replaced regulation 17/62.22 The new sys-
tem of enforcement is one of parallel enforcement, where the Commission and 
national authorities all are competent to apply the treaty provisions on competi-
tion. 23 However, it is still the ambition that each case should be handled by a 
single authority. To this end, the regulation with complementing instruments set 
up a ”European Competition Network” intended as an instrument for the alloca-
tion of cases between the different authorities. The rules set out in the relevant 
instruments are not binding but only set out the criteria that are to be applied in 
order to determine whether or not an authority is ”well placed” to deal with a 
particular case. The presumption is that the first authority to come contact with 
the case should continue to handle it. Apart from these guidelines the regulation 
provides no rules on the determination of jurisdiction between the Member 
States.24 
There are also some noteworthy provisions on the relationship between the 
Commission and the national authorities. Article 11 (6) states that the compe-
tence of national authorities to apply the treaty provisions on competition shall 
be extinguished when the Commission chooses to initiate proceedings. In order 
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to ensure the uniform application of Union law, Article 16 states that national 
authorities may not make decisions that would run counter to a decision already 
adopted or contemplated by the Commission. The new regulation also deter-
mines the relationship between national and union law on competition in its arti-
cle 3. It states that national authorities should always apply the union provisions 
in parallel with national competition law. It also gives that enterprises that are 
considered not to restrict competition within the meaning of Article 81 cannot be  
deemed to do so by national authorities beyond the territory of that state Article 
6 TEU provides the sources of fundamental rights in the EU. As mentioned 
above, the Union is now obliged to accede to the ECHR and in the future the 
convention will be one of the direct sources of fundamental rights in the Union. 
For now, though, its influence remains indirect. Instead, the two main sources of 
fundamental rights are the CFR, which has the same legal value as the treaties, 
and the general principles of EU law, of which the ECHR together with the 
common constitutional traditions of the member states are the indirect source. 
Ultimately a great part of the doctrine started to consider more positively 
the application of the principle of ne bis in idem in the field of European antitrust 
judicial environment. The principle of ne bis in idem is strictly bonded with the 
most significant foundational theories such as freedom of movement and hu-
man rights are. There will be always that specific issue concerning as to wheth-
er a prosecuting authority or more authorities are allowed to bring separate el-
ements of the same offence and the contrast with the ne bis in idem will always 
be a problematic to solve and deal with. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In the first part of this thesis an effort has been made in order to clarify 
what horizontal agreements are and give more detailed terminology of the no-
tion itself. The European Legislator’s will was to give more space to the national 
authorities and did not want to enter in a more specific and detailed notion of 
the various terms concerning antitrust legal material. On the other hand, there is 
not a unique definition of all that terminology since every national authority has 
its own point of view. Notions such as internal market, undertaking, agreement, 
competition and economical standards are not yet unified and crystallized in a 
unique formulation. There is still a lot to be done in order for the national judicial 
systems to fully adopt a unique legal system in order for the integration to be-
come more realistic. The fact is that legal order, such as anti competition law, is 
way too difficult to standardized. Not even a case is the same with another and 
every single infringement has to be dealt with a unique and new approach. Only 
time and the upcoming of new judgments of the European Court of Justice will 
establish what antitrust law would be. 
A great debate has risen concerning the effectiveness of anti competition 
law against cartels and agreements between competitors. There is a part of the 
doctrine that supports penal sanctions against antitrust infringements. However, 
I believe that that point of view does not resolve any problems and is not the 
right way to follow in order to sanction such illegal actions. I tried in the second 
part of this thesis to illustrated both parts of the doctrine and emphasize a little 
more on the principle of ne bis in idem. Truth is that, Greek National Constitu-
tional Court as well as international Court of human rights have already ruled on 
this subject and were clear enough. They have as well accepted the principle of 
ne bis in idem over the national competition laws.  
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